In stark contrast, our independence seems less effective in anchoring our national narrative. There are many possible explanations for this. While most nations fought to be sovereign, we didn't. It is often regarded that independence was unexpectedly thrusted upon us by Malaysia. Putatively neither did we possess a unique identity to preserve or common cause to pursue. Also, given our small size and lack of natural resources, complete self-determination appeared as both an unnecessary and unfeasible pursuit . This has lead many to believe that Singapore’s eventual independence was an “accident”.
But if one were to dig deeper into the events preceding August 9th 1965, these commonly held beliefs get challenged: One would realize that our peaceful, unexpected independence belies the fact that it’s Singapore active insistence on values such as equality and multi-racialism alongside demand for a higher degree of self-determination which precipitated its secession from Malaysia.
The Path to Merger
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| Newspaper report on results of the referendum on merger |
THERE WERE many compelling reasons for Singapore to merge with Malaya. Lacking natural resources, Singapore needed a hinterland to sustain its economic activity. Also Singapore’s small physical size made it especially vulnerable to the threat of communists. There were strong cultural ties binding Singapore with Malaya too. Most of Singapore's cabinet ministers hailed from the northern neighbour . People to people ties ran long and deep too.
Hence, it made sense for the PAP government to press for a merger with Malaya. Newly elected in 1959, the PAP enthusiastically embarked on talks of a merger with the Malayan government. The process was long drawn. The eagerness of Singapore to be part of the federation wasn't matched by Malaya. The Malayan leaders including then Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, were concerned about how including Singapore, with its Chinese majority, would alter the racial composition in their disfavour.
However, what likely made PM Tunku reconsider his position was the increasing prospect of communists taking over Singapore. The communists were posing a credible threat to the PAP government.Then Ong Eng Guan- an ex-PAP Mayor- with pro-communists inclinations competed under the United People's party banner and triumphed over PAP's Jek Yuen Thong in a closely watched Hong Lim by-election. The possibility of Singapore becoming a "second Cuba" unnerved PM Tunku. These dangerous political developments made the Malayan side reconsider its unwillingness to the merger.
Eventually, by including Sabah and Sarawak into Federal Malaysia and classifying the aboriginals residing as “special” status Malays, Tunku's fear of “an unfavourable” racial composition was averted.
Apart from the hesitation of Malaya to embrace Singapore as its own, Singapore's differentiated status in the Federation indicates that Singapore's distance from Malaya. Singapore negotiated to retain control for educational and labour policies. In exchange, its federal representation was limited.By account of population, Singapore ought to have been allocated 24 seats in the Federal Parliament. But it only received 15 seats.Singapore retained its own Public Service Commission as well.
To ensure the legitimacy of the merger, a referendum had been conducted on the issue; largely due to the effort put in by the PAP about 70% of the population voted in favour of the merger despite the boisterous opposition from the pro-communist parties.
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| Celebrations at Padang on day of Singapore's merger with Malaya |
ON SEPTEMBER 16th 1963, Singapore joined Malaya. The amalgamated unit was thereon known as Malaysia. The day was marked with great fanfare. The Padang was in festive mood; newly fledged Malaysians reveled in the moment.
But as the fanfare of the day subsided, the difficulty of governing alongside parties with starkly different ideologies and unaligned ambitions came into sharp relief. The marriage between Singapore and Malaya was one made out of convenience and the bonds holding both entities were weak to begin with. As time went and expectations on both sides went unmet, hopes of sustaining the relationship further dimmed.
On the economic front, Singapore was disappointed with the slow implementation of the common market promised by Malaysia; Malaysia felt let down by Singapore's unwillingness to push ahead with the aid to develop the Borneo territories. The federal government also considered increasing the tax revenue contributions from Singapore from 40% to 60%, much to the displeasure of Singapore.
On the political front, the temperature was clearly rising as both ruling parties- UMNO and PAP- undercut each other by taking part in elections held in each other’s bastions. UMNO set up a Singapore-based party and competed in Singapore’s state election-the first one following the merger- held in September 1963. It also upped the racial rhetoric which was partly to blame for the violent racial riots of 1964.
Singapore also desired to increase its influence on the federal-level decisions affecting it. While it had legislative voice, there was no representation in the executive cabinet. All the states of the federation- including the newly joined Sabah and Sarawak- however had cabinet level ministers. Determined to ensure Singapore’s perspective was considered by the Federal government, the PAP decided to participate in the federal parliamentary elections in April 1964 challenging UMNO in its own turf.
The PAP also organised a Malaysian Solidarity convention in May 1965, which served as a platform to champion the vision of a "Malaysia for Malaysians". The spirit of the convention went against the fundamentals tenants of Malaysian politics such as the race-based parties and special rights for the Malays.
This abrasive approach combined with the antithetical ideology of Singapore certainly chafed those who helmed the Malaysian Federation.
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| A teary-faced Lee Kuan Yew announcing Singapore's separation from Malaysia |
The PAP government then stood its ground and was prepared to accept the consequences.
The last blow to the strained relationship came in May 1965. Then PM Lee Kuan Yew delivered a scathing assessment of UMNO’s ineffective approaches in racial, economical and political matters in the federal parliament. Much to the worry of the Tunku, many Malay MPs including even those from the rural parts-which were UMNOs's stronghold- were in agreement with Lee Kuan Yew. The concern that political power would desert him and UMNO affirmed his conviction that Singapore had to be hived off. Following the speech, he swiftly initiated discussions with Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Keng Swee to make arrangements for Singapore’s secession.
On August 9th 1965, Singapore was proclaimed independent- a widely regard “nightmare” scenario few thought would ever materialize. .
Conclusion
SO WAS independence thrusted by Malaysia ? A straightforward reading of history, would afford an affirmative to the question. Singapore never explicitly demanded to be independent. Our preferred option was to be part of Federal Malaysia.
However looking deeply, one would find that though, it was Malaysia which broached the topic of secession first, the move was to a large extent precipitated by Singapore’s actions. Also, when given with the choice of moving ahead as the part of the union and accepting the compromise of having limited say in governance and giving up on the vision of Malaysian Malaysia where all races were treated equally, we consistently stuck to our convictions despite the attendant risks- which had been fully grasped.