The Govt and the Police (SPF) have come out with a slew of measures since the shocking riot at Race Course Road on December 8th. Some can be said to be knee-jerk like the blanket ban on alcohol sales and consumption, others more timely like stepped up patrols and installation of cameras. Moreover a Commission of Inquiry (COI) has been set up headed by retired Justice G P Selvam and comprising retired CP, Tee Tua Ba, ex NTUC Chairman John de Payva and West Coast CCC member Andrew Chua. Of course there will be sceptics about the composition, but I think having a Judge is correct and also a policeman (retired) has to be included to shed light into the police action. I also believe Mr de Payva's inclusion is to consider the worker's aspect in this case.
Retired High Court Judge, G Pannirselvam will chair the 4 man Commission of Inquiry.
In furtherance to my previous 2 articles, I have some suggestions which I hope both the COI and Police will look into. I was at Race Course Road on Saturday night, and I came away with the feeling that it was the 'safest street in Singapore. Special Operations Command (SOC) riot busses, patrol cars with flashing lights were patrolling the streets, accompanied by uniformed and plainclothes policemen on foot patrol. It does also shore up the general feeling that the SPF is more a reactionary force than a preventive one. That said it's better than doing nothing.
Race Course Road and the surrounding vicinity have been equipped with lots of CCTVs.
However before I list my suggestions, there's 2 aspects that I've found troubling in the aftermath of the riot. The first is the quick rush of support by a large number of pro-PAP supporters for the SPF and to a lesser extent - the SCDF. There was a call to change their Facebook avatars to the logo of the Home Team and even this page:
Of course they are not wrong to thank the officers who were prepared to do their duty in spite of getting injured. We all are sympathetic and wish the 39 officers from the Home Team a speedy recovery and to continue doing their duties undeterred by this sad incident. But what's troubling is their 'blind support' in that any criticism of the SPF is also an attack on the PAP and the Govt. This is a dangerous precedent - the SPF is not part of the PAP in any sense and must never be. Pro-PAP supporters must not relate or link any criticism of the SPF's conduct in the lead up and during the riot as an attack on the PAP. The SPF is a public body that answers to the public it serves. Criticism of the SPF by the public must never be regarded as unjustified or impermissible. It's not the duty of PAP supporters to defend the SPF in the same way they are allowed to defend PAP policy. They are allowed to rubbish any criticism of the PAP, even if it's wrong, because they are supporters of the party. But the Police is not a political party and any criticism of it must not descend into a political matter.
CP Ng Joo Hee, DCP Rajakumar visit the scene together with their bosses - Ministers Iswaran and Teo Chee Hian.
The other troubling aspect with the advent of social media like FB or Twitter, are the numerous posts by members of the SPF and SCDF in total support of their organisations and the rejection of any criticism directed at it. I am not going to provide examples in order to give these officers some privacy but if you've been following this saga on the numerous pages and platforms on FB, you'll easily find officers engaging harshly with netizens who criticised the conduct of officers at the scene. Although this was done in their private capacity, this is also troubling, because officers have sworn an oath to act without favour. This means they have to accept that the public can and must be allowed to criticise their conduct, even if they think this is unfair or unjustified. Phrases like ' if you think you can do a better job or are so smart, why don't you go down and handle the rioters' and so forth should be avoided at all costs. This is should be 1 of the first things Commissioner (CP) Ng Joo Hee should do, to instruct his officers not to get involved in slanging matches with the public over the execution of their duties. Police Officers are deemed by law to be 'on duty' 24 hours a day, so even private remarks can cast a shadow over their commitment to protect and serve the public. We cannot have a culture of police officers who are affected by adverse comments going about doing their daily tasks. Some officers can develop a mindset of mistrust or hatred for the public and treat anyone questioning or criticising them in person in their course of their duties as 'an enemy.'
Although they have a right to consider their safety, policemen hiding in an ambulance and then running away, wasn't taken in a sympathetic light by some Singaporeans, which they were entitled to take.
The public have a right to be aghast at the sight of police officers hiding in an ambulance and then running away. They have a right to be angry when the police refuses permits for peaceful protests and warn of dire consequences but seemed overwhelmed and powerless when a group of foreigners disregarded them and instead attacked them. Whether fair or not, it does create a feeling of resentment that law-abiding Singaporeans are cowed into submission, whilst foreigners can just disregard the law.
That said, there have been a lot of conspiracy theories about the cause of the riot and some remarks by the public have no foundation but based on assumptions and hearsay, even the following one made former presidential candidate, Tan Kin Lian:
Mr Tan had no basis to make this statement based purely on hearsay. It has not been corroborated by any evidence or testimony by someone at the scene, be it from the SPF, the Press or public.
However there is also truth in some criticisms made by other members of the public that the Police were slow to react or realise the scale of the unfolding incident until it was too late. And they were right to feel disappointed by the very low number of arrests made (33 thus far charged not even 10% of the estimated number of rioters). Not forgetting remarks made by CP Ng, who was quick to praise his officers for not using lethal force but offered no willingness to accept blame for the incident, failure of his management team, the injuries or damage of public and private property estimated to hit close to $1 million. In fact 1 FB reader summed it up perfectly with this line: ' The Police have done a good job in saying that they have done a good job.'
The CP can say the Police did a good a job at elections rallies especially opposition ones, but praising his men in the riot control without acknowledging failures, was too much of a stretch.
As mentioned in my previous 2 articles, I firmly believed that the Police management must shoulder a lot of the blame for the way the incident unfolded. Of course the rioters must get blamed and punished first and foremost, but that doesn't mean the Police are blameless either. Had they heeded the warning signs and been more pro-active, most likely a different outcome would have been the result. But lest it be said that I only criticised them, I also offered some scenarios and possible courses of action as well. With the formation of the COI, here are a few more, which I hope they will look into and the SPF to consider and implement where they see fit.
1) The despatching/arrival of the first responding Police Officers
Although I urge people to be slow in criticising them, the COI and SPF must start here. The fatal accident happened around 9.20pm and a call was placed at 9.23pm. Yet the first patrol officers arrived at 9.40pm (together with the ambulance). Now we were not told if the first car despatched was a '999 fast response car' (from Tanglin or 'E' Division) or a Traffic Police (TP) expressway patrol car. If an 'E Div' car was first despatched that should be the correct course, since they patrol a specific zone like Little India and their ability to respond should be faster, as opposed to a TP car that covers a larger area and would normally take longer to arrive for most incidents.
A damaged TP Volvo Expressway patrol car. Who was initially despatched, them or E Div's patrol car?
If a TP car was first despatched then this would reflect a poor delegation of duties by the 999 operators. Just because it was a traffic accident does not mean that only TP cars should be mobilised. A divisional car should be the first choice since this was in area teeming with thousands of passers-by, and the response must be prompt. Anyway if the E Div car was first mobilised, we also must look at why it took them 17 minutes to arrive. They should have realised the gravity of situation the moment the call came in and used their sirens to ensure a faster response time. This 17 minute delay had caused the crowd to get agitated and unsupervised they began to take matters into their own hands.
2) The preliminary incident scene management by them
In responding to a call like this, the officers should have realised it was going to be a 'messy and emotional scene'. They need to be psychologically prepared and must have a proper and systematic method of dealing with the scene. They need to realise their primary duty upon arriving - to contain and control the crowd and let the SCDF officers deal with the casualty (deceased).
From this photo, it doesn't seem that the area was cordoned off when the first officers arrived, allowing the crowd to come within touching distance.
The 1st thing they should have done is separate the passers-by and crowd from the immediate scene. This would involve erecting a cordon around the scene and ensuring the crowd stays out of it. Did they do this? This is a key question. The next thing would be to call for back-up to help manage the scene. Since this was an Indian (Tamil) crowd, a Tamil Officer should have been summoned to assist (if there was none present)
With an agitated crowd, the next step would be to ask for eye witnesses and identify them. The first persons would be the bus passengers and those who witnessed the accident. This would at least indicate to the crowd they were serious in ensuring justice. They should also use their loudhailers (available in the car) to communicate over the noisy scene.
3) SOP regarding fatal accidents should be modified.
In 'normal' fatal accident scenes, the driver is usually kept at the scene until the arrival of the TP IO (Investigating Officer). The IO and his traffic accident management team will deal with the scene and eventually arrest the driver, while the responding officers provide assistance to secure the body until removed by the under-taker. The TP IO usually takes some time to arrive. With an agitated crowd, the responding officers should have disregarded this SOP, and acted hastily to remove both driver and coordinator who were seen by the crowd as being responsible for the accident. They need not be arrested as yet, but their removal could have been perceived by the crowd that some immediate justice was being done. Both should have been removed to the nearby Tanglin Police Station barely 500 metres away. The first officers could then tell the crowd and witnesses that they were 'arrested; and thus placate them. Don't forget the racial overtones here as well - I believe both were Chinese. Their 'arrest' would indicate to the Indian crowd that no favouritism was being shown.
4) How soon was a Senior Officer at the deteriorating scene?
In this posed photo, a Police ASP is briefing his junior officers. On Dec 8th, how soon was an Inspector or higher there to take charge?
If the responders had realised the gravity and asked for more manpower, the next key question was how soon was a Senior Officer despatched to the scene, to take charge and assess the situation? In incidents involving large crowds the Police management must be situationally aware and get key decision makers to the scene as soon as possible.
5) How soon was SOC alerted and who could make this call?
Riot Police Officers observe the scene. How soon can they be activated and by whom, should be a key point the COI must look into?
I believe Junior Officers (JOs) do not have the authority to activate SOC and this must go through a chain of command. Therefore a Senior Officer (SO) must be present to recommend it or the Duty Officer Radio ( 999 operations) must liaise with the JOs at the scene and then inform either the Director Ops or CP. All this may take time, and the COI and Police must study this procedure and come up with a faster way of activating SOC or the Gurkhas. In a rapidly deteriorating scene, should the formalities of having an SO to make a determination be dispensed with and allow the responding officers to make the call immediately.
Other points to consider are as follows:
6) Having a proper drop-off/pick up point for private busses.
The current policy of blocking Hampshire Road for numerous private busses to stop and wait does not look like a good one. These busses have no right to block a public road merely for the sake of making money. Little India has always been a rendezvous for foreign workers (FW) and they have always found ways to make it there. The trend of private busses ferrying them to and fro is a recent one since the turn of the century.
A street map showing Hampshire, Rutland and Dorset Roads. A possible entry and exit point for private busses on Sundays.
Strictly speaking there's no real need for them to be there for hours on end. Their banning this weekend proves this. The FWs can always use public transport, but if the fear that tens of thousands of them clogging up our already crowded public transport system, then fair enough, these busses can be allowed to operate but under close supervision by the LTA. They should not be allowed to use the narrow Race Course Road to traverse. Instead an alternative pick-up/drop off point away from the masses should be identified. I propose using Rutland Road (next to the Farrer Park Swimming complex). Busses enter from Hampshire Road, turn into Rutland Road - drop and pick up and then exit via Dorset Road.
7) Interviewing and Identifying the primary cause of the riot and any other underlying ones.
Obviously there are some who are quick to point the blame at the Govt for allowing a mass influx of FWs and doing little to help them. The low pay and 'poor' living conditions are the chief reasons they believe that caused this riot. These lowly paid FWs had had enough and decided to lash out. They also rubbish the Govt claims that alcohol played a primary part and mocked the 2 day ban imposed over the weekend. They feel this is a cover-up to hide Govt ineptitude.
Plainclothes policemen detain a rioter. The COI should speak to such persons to find out why they rioted, instead of just listening to the police or reading statements recorded by them.
The poor conditions and low pay make well prove a factor when the COI looks into it. To fully clarify this, the COI must interview witnesses at the scene, fellow Indian and Bangladeshi FWs not involved in the riot and crucially, they must attempt to interview the suspects arrested (even those charged and convicted). They gotta hear it from the 'horses' mouth' and not base it on hearsay or the testimony of police officers only.
But I'm sticking to my own assumption for the cause and feel the COI will most probably find along similar lines. The riot was primarily caused by 'mob anger' similar to what they are used to back home whenever a fatal accident occurs. Alcohol played a part (but surely all 400 couldn't have been intoxicated or consumed alcohol) and being egged on by fellow countrymen and friends, it descended as such. The other related factors include the poor treatment of their fellow countrymen by private bus operators. This is a true fact, if you have witnessed how much contempt these bus drivers and coordinators sometimes treat these workers with. Scolding them and brushing them off rudely. The indifferent attitude of the driver and coordinator after running over the victim could have also played a part. LTA should be proactive and monitor these drivers and make sure they treat them well and with respect. Those who fail to do so should have their vocational licenses suspended or revoked. This is a lucrative business for them, if not for these FWs, their buses would be idle on Sundays. But here they can charge anywhere from $2-5 for a one way trip. Multiply it by around 40 pax and number trips, each bus can generate quite a good bit of profit. The other related factors were the ones I mentioned about the responding officers actions in Points 1-3.
Foreign construction workers from India and Bangladesh pay huge agent's fees just to be able to work here. With meagre salaries, it takes them a long time to clear their debts.
As for poor living conditions, the PM has said he will direct the relevant ministry to ensure they have proper accommodation. Coming to meagre salaries, yes it's low but much more than what they would earn back home. Most come from rural villages with only 2 months of harvest to survive the whole year on. Although their pay varies from $300 to $500 on average per month and should be raised to reflect the hard menial labour they put in, merely increasing will not solve the real problem - corrupt employers and agents. Some of these workers pay up to $7000 just to be able to work here and spent almost 1 1/2 years clearing that debt. Why so much? Because many corrupt employers tell employment agents that they want a 'cut' from the agent fees. I touched on this practice is this earlierpost. If the COI and Govt really wants to help these FWs, they must investigate, warn and prosecute firms that resort to this tactic to enrich themselves. I understand the market rate is anywhere from $1500 - $300 per unskilled FW. Imagine a boss who's allowed to bring in 100 FWs, at $2000 per worker, he makes a huge $200,000 before these workers actually start work.
8) Have SOC troops stationed close-by when large crowds gather
Instead of having SOC troops elsewhere and then have to be activated, the SPF should always ensure they are stationed within touching distance when large crowds gather. 1 or 2 SOC units should be stationed at Tanglin Police Station on Sundays, so that they can respond quickly to any untoward incident. For Clarke and Boat Quays having them stationed at the nearest NPCs would also be wise. I understand it's not possible to always expect them to be on site and patrolling on foot, but having them close by would be the next best thing.
9) Issue warning cards and briefings for all FWs working here.
The US Navy actually briefs its sailors that come ashore here during their visits here. This is to warn them not to break Singapore laws and that the authorities here take a dim view of anti-social acts. Similarly when MOM issues work permits to FWs here, they should have a warning card in their native tongue listing the do's and don'ts. Better still ensure that employers and agents brief them, and make regular visits to dorms to explain our laws. Some FWs may not be fully aware of our laws. They may think it's permissible to strike, to exact street justice or doing crazy stuff in order to plead their plights. A little effort like this might mean a whole lot of difference in keeping them in check and allowing them a trouble free work life here.
US Sailors watch their vessel the USS Freedom. These sailors are briefed before setting foot in Singapore.
So there you have it, my analysis and suggestions that I hope the COI and SPF will look into and give serious thought. I may not have all the answers or be able merely by typing some fancy article to solve and prevent another riot, but at least I'm trying to be of help and offer constructive or reasonable ideas. Talking of preventing the riot, I came across this blog entry by a former police officer from 'E Div'. In the article (see link below), he boldly claims he would have been able to stop the riot had he still been in the Force. So read it with 'a large pinch of salt', although amidst all the bluster, he does raise a few pertinent points which surely must be worth considering by his former employers.
http://gangasudhan.blogspot.sg/2013/12/i-could-have-stopped-riot.html
Sir Nelspruit
*The writer blogs at http://anyhowhantam.blogspot.sg/